Messay Kebede
Three features seem to distinguish Fano from other known armed insurgencies: its uncentered nature, its lack of a formal political manifesto, and the rapidity of its military advances. As a rule, armed insurgencies begin under the command of a tightly organized small group adhering to an explicit political vision and take years to liberate territories. Not so with Fano: in a seemingly spontaneous fashion, the insurgency flared up in various places in the Amhara region, including in major urban areas, with the common but undefined theme of saving the Amhara people. It forced the Amhara regional government to ask for the federal government’s assistance, which quickly led to the declaration of a six-month state of emergency and counterattacks by government forces to retake the cities. One can easily trace Fano’s widely discussed difficulty in coming under one military and political command to the fragmented and uncentered character of its insurgency. Yet, notwithstanding the fragmentation, Fano has achieved impressive military and political victories in a very short time, to the point of becoming the game changer of Ethiopian politics. This paper aims to unravel the causes of the obstacles to unity, their consequences, and the suggested solutions to remove them, while also accounting for the accomplished successes despite the fragmentation and the lack of a common manifesto.
Reasons behind Fragmentation
As much as one is right in deploring Fano’s divisions, one should not discount the genuine efforts made by Fano groups to form larger sub-regional commands, including their effort, albeit so far unsuccessful, to bring all Fano units under one military and political command. Nor should one lose sight of or underestimate the common cause binding the various Fano groups. How otherwise could one explain the determination and swift victories of Fano fighters? That the insurgency spread like wildfire can only point to the puissance of their common cause, which is the protection of Amhara people and interests and their resolute opposition to the government of Abiy Ahmed.
Even if one cannot discount that poor determination and skill as well as incompetent leadership explain the inability of governmental troops to prevail, Fano’s military victories cannot be properly accounted for without appealing to the force of commitment to the common cause. However, the more we insist on the mobilizing power of the cause, the less we understand how such a strong common commitment could allow Fano’s factionalism. Hence, the need to find reasons compelling enough to explain this perplexing association of a powerful common cause with organizational and ideological divisions.
Among the compelling reasons, many observers cite
the fact that there is no such thing as an ‘Amhara’ identity, and hence it’s far more immediate for people to organise along the regional lines, such as Shewa, Gonder, Gojjam, and Wollo. . . . This sentiment is equally strong in the diaspora and animates forms of social organising.
In view of the fact that Amhara tradition and history have canonized the sub-regional identifications of Gojjamie Gondere, Wolloye, etc., it is not surprising that Fano fighters follow the same tradition to come together and organize in a time of crisis and turmoil. Add to the impact of subregional identification geographical barriers that are unfavorable to the conditions needed to organize frequent meetings and discussions among Fano leaders. Indeed, being interspersed by mountains and valleys, the vast Amhara region, while sheltering the military operations of Fano, equally hampers the opportunities to “meet in person and hold continuous discussions on the matter of establishing a central command while fighting with the army.” Mention should also be made of the difficulty of holding successive and long meetings shielded from the power of modern means of detection.
For many commentators, another compelling factor is the lack of a clear-cut political manifesto around which the various groups could coalesce besides the general imperative of defending Amhara interests by all means. Various reasons are advanced to explain the lack. According to the group called “Concerned Ethiopians,” some Fano leaders do not see the necessity of a manifesto at this stage of the struggle: “they rally behind “መነሻችን አማራ፣ መድረሻችን ኢትዮጵያ” [ our departure is Amhara, our arrival Ethiopia] slogan that means everything and nothing at the same time.” The slogan is vague and ambiguous because it elaborates neither on the departure nor on the future of Ethiopia. Since the proposed goal remains undefined in political terms, it can only serve as a general rallying point that puts everybody in the same box without indicating any specific direction and roadmap. For the same reason, it does not show why political and military unity is crucial to materializing the intended goal.
So long as the goal is undefined, it naturally invites different interpretations. Thus, for some Fano groups, “there is no victory short of removing the Oromo-PP led government, while others believe that if certain conditions are met a negotiated settlement is the most viable and least costly way forward.” The lack of consensus on a clearly defined goal easily translates into different political positions fracturing the Fano movement. For instance, the program to expand the insurgency into other regions of Ethiopia obviously requires the formation of coalitions with groups outside Amhara opposing the government. Depending on the way the goal is understood, some groups maintain that “such a broad coalition can wait until Fano achieves victory” while “others believe such a coalition must be formed as a matter of urgency.”
The need to prioritize is another source of contention: seeing “political dialogues and debates as distraction,” some Fano groups insist that absolute primacy must be given to the military front; others “stand in the way of developing consensus” by arguing that “a vaguely constructed slogan” is more than enough at this stage of the struggle. For these two groups, what is crucially important and urgent is to stop the war of genocide against the Amhara people by governmental forces, a goal attainable by using effectively the mobilizing power of grievance politics.
Let us not forget that extremism sprays its own divisive voice across the spectrum of Fano groups. These Amhara extremists are those who want “to dial back the time to when the Amhara played a dominant role in state politics.” Their goal is to overthrow Abiy’s government, dissolve the parliament, and replace the constitution with a new one that is more conducive to restoring Amhara hegemony. Since they know that their project has little chance of gaining the support of other ethnic groups, they intend to use force to implement it.
In the eyes of analysts, the intervention of Amhara diaspora groups is the other barrier to the formation of a central political and military command. Because these groups engage in fund-raising and lobbying activities, they exert an influential role. The trouble is that the Amhara diaspora community is itself divided, with the consequence that each Fano group comes under the influence of different and competing diaspora groups. Both the divisions and meddling of the Amhara diaspora do no more than add fuel to an already divided insurgency. There is here a puzzle that needs to be sorted out. While it is clear to everybody that unity is essential for Fano to prevail, the divisive and partisan meddling of the diaspora, a behavior openly denounced by some Fano leaders, is hard to comprehend. What could be its motive or motives?
The explanation that comes to mind is to say that, in adopting a partisan approach, diaspora groups want to crown this or that person from this or that Fano group as a leader and thereby be “perceived as kingmakers.” In thus using their influence to advance their own interests instead of incentivizing Fano groups to integrate by supporting Fano as a whole, they add fuel to the existing divisions. Now, if we go further and ask why Amhara diaspora groups want to become kingmakers rather than providers of external assistance, we encounter the desire to use their support to leverage political influence. If we dig further into this desire, we find the belief that Fano leaders lack the necessary vision to provide, by themselves, political and ideological leadership to the insurgency. Brave and committed as they are, Fano fighters are after all just fighters and, as such, in need of enlightened mentors.
What better proof is there of the unfitness of Fano leaders than their inability to lay down their political visions and agree on a common manifesto? Exposing the underestimation of Fano leaders, Fano Lisan writes: “ፋኖ በዮቲዩብና በአንዳንድ ሚዲያዎች እንደሚነገረው ‘አንድ ያልሆነ፣ አንድ አመራርና ቅንጅት የሌለው፣ ‘በጥይት ቅንድብ የሚላጭ’ ነገር ግን ብዙ የሚያስብና ሰው የሌለበት፣ ማኒፌስቶ ያልጻፈና ወዴት መድረስ እንዳለበት በቅጡ የማያውቅ ተደርጎ ሲሳል እናያለን።” Sad to say, in underestimating Fano leaders, the diaspora and other intellectuals repeat the same mistake that MEISON leaders committed when they thought that members of the Derg are politically and ideologically incapable of providing leadership to the1974 revolution.
And last, but not least reason for the internal divisions of Fano is, of course, the outbreak of power struggle among Fano leaders. We have already mentioned that the Amhara subregional divisions of Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo, and Shewa were traditionally part of the history of the Amhara people. Each subregion was a political center endowed with its own defense force and standing in competition against the other centers, including a competition for the highest power of “king of kings” of Ethiopia. The fact that Fano groups have coalesced around these subregional identities is little surprising for someone who pays attention to the history of the Amhara people. Even if the ethno-nationalist norm of political organization under the TPLF’s rule has erased the political importance of the subregional identities, it has not succeeded in uprooting them from the minds of the Amhara people. Seeing, against all odds, the long survival of Ethiopia, the conclusion that the subregional organizational scheme of Fano is necessarily a bad outcome may be too rushed a judgment.
Countering Negativity
The alleged shortcomings are hard to digest because they clash with Fano’s well-known astonishing accomplishments. To begin with the underestimation of Fano leaders, in light of their rapid and effective military victories against a vast, well-armed, and better financed government army, one cannot avoid the recognition that Fano’s accomplishments require the ability to organize, select achievable goals, and design careful plans to implement them in a flexible but determined manner. In the words of one supporter,
in this short time frame, Fano has sustained its operations and shown significant tactical adeptness. Despite being pitted against well-equipped and trained government forces, Fano’s strategies have often outmaneuvered these forces, leveraging local knowledge and community support to offset the government’s superiority in arms and resources. This illustrates Fano’s strategic competence and highlights its rapid adaptability and learning curve under pressure.
Against the argument of political and ideological incompetence, one must underline the professional and educational diversity composing Fano’s social make-up. From peasants, workers, soldiers, and officers, to engineers, university teachers, and diverse professionals, Fano’s composition shows a remarkable variety of skills, educational levels, and professional aptitudes. Given this composition, to assume that able leaders cannot emerge from a situation that is, moreover, extremely challenging is disrespectful both to the Amhara people and Fano fighters [ከዚው ውስጥ መሪ አይወጣም ማለት ለህዝብም ለታጋዮቹም ንቀት ያስመስለዋል።].
The combination of able leadership with the varied composition of Fano compels us to come up with objective reasons, rather than incompetence, to account for the divisions and lack of a unifying political manifesto. One such reason draws attention to the formation and growth of Fano’s fighting force. What is specific about the force is that it has gone through the process of building itself from the ground up. As a rule, armed insurgencies are initiated by dedicated small and ideologically united groups of people who recruit other people over time so that the organizational process goes from top to bottom. In such a case, centralized command and ideological unity are built into the organization and always accompany its process of expansion. This style of growth changes the establishment of unified command and the acquisition of a common manifesto into nothing more than an officialization of what is already in existence.
Such is not the case with a fighting force that grew from the ground up. Unity and ideological convergence between fighters must be built step by step, county by county, district by district. Not only does this form of organization require more time and numerous discussions, but it is also faced with the difficult task of instituting an accepted leadership, as it is bound to select among competing candidates. Yet, these time-consuming difficulties do not come without their compensatory benefits. For one thing, the process of building from the ground up indicates that the insurrection has started in various localities and has grown in a centripetal fashion. This suggests that it has wide popular support and that it has its roots in grievances felt across the entire Amhara society. Unlike the centrifugal form of expansion, which involves steady growth using persuasion and indoctrination, the Amhara uprising looked spontaneous and spread like a bushfire.
For another, leadership constituted by a centripetal form of organization offers the distinct benefit of being selective and merit-based. A fighting organization built from the bottom up has the advantage of instituting committed, disciplined, and battle-hardened leaders. Moreover, leaders have little chance of being selected unless they show prudence, insightfulness, care, and tactical mindfulness. In short, the centripetal fashion guarantees the kind of leadership that is wise and trustworthy. The selection by merit of the leadership explains, among other things, the ethical behavior of Fano fighters, a behavior attested by their treatment of the civilian population as well as of prisoners captured from the government’s army.
The other benefit of a merit-based selection is the opportunity given to Fano and the Amhara people to revise some accepted misconceptions. Those who complain about Fano’s inability to agree on a common platform and political leadership little realize that their criticisms originate from the engrained belief of Ethiopians that an organization works properly only if it is centralized, hierarchical, and ideologically one. The belief is an internalization of the bad bent inherited from the successive dictatorial governments that ruled and continue to rule Ethiopia since the introduction of modernity. The imperative demand that Fano fighters come under one military and political center, under pain of not being able to defeat Abiy’s government, is bred by the belief that decentralization and diversity entail anarchy and confusion as to who should lead the fight. In other words, the absence of tightly centralized control and command considerably weakens the ability to fight efficiently, encourages further fragmentation, and obstructs the design of an all-encompassing vision. Yet, the more the virtues of centralization are hailed, the more they bring to mind whether, in embodying them, Fano does not abandon its leaning towards the cause of democracy in the future Ethiopia. If democracy is not implemented internally in the first place, does it not raise a legitimate concern as to Fano’s determination to democratize Ethiopian politics?
Importance of Unity
To warn against centralization and ideological uniformity does not mean that unity, though not absolutely necessary, is not the right strategic option. In the eyes of many commentators, Fano cannot realize its mission without military and political unity. Let us see whether they present convincing arguments upholding their belief that Fano cannot succeed without ending its military divisions and fractured political stands.
Before going into the disadvantages of disunity, fairness demands that we should look into the positive role it played, if only to explain the successes so far achieved by Fano. One thing is sure: the lack of central command and dispersion into local units have enabled Fano to deliver surprise localized attacks that disrupted the government’s ability to respond effectively. Moreover, decentralization and the localism of the insurgency have made the early arrest or elimination of Fano leaders a difficult undertaking. One other argument in favor of approaching the issue of division with some optimism is that other similar insurgent groups have confronted the same problem and successfully restored unity. We can cite the case of the African National Congress in South Africa, the National Liberation Front during the Algerian War of Independence, the Eritrean liberation struggle, and many more. In all these cases, “common vision and shared goals were essential to keeping the groups together and becoming successful.”
Whatever positive outcomes fragmentation had in the early stages of the struggle, the dominant view is that it has now become a serious liability. Two basic ideas usually uphold this dominant view: 1. unity is essential for Fano to assume a national standing; 2. the path to forming a broad coalition with partners from other regions presupposes unity of political vision and military command on Fano’s part. Let us look closer into the two ideas.
What is obvious is that neither the Amhara people nor the rest of Ethiopia can see Fano as a national contestant so long as it remains locally and sub-regionally divided. It will be confined to localities and sub-regional regional references, thereby failing to represent even the Amhara people as a whole, let alone being able to advocate broad national interests. Worse yet, this kind of division, which for now is confined to power struggle, carries “the threat of warlordism.” This probable outcome, besides dividing the Amhara region, could also lead to civil war unless unity is quickly restored.
Among the downsides of the inability to come together, we find detrimental military consequences. For many commentators, this kind of divided armed insurgency can possibly liberate local places; it cannot succeed in defeating and chasing governmental troops from the entire Amhara region. The delay of total victory will continue the state of war in the Amhara region “for the foreseeable future.” This will give time to Abiy to use the financial (including those provided by foreign allies) and human resources of the government to continue the war, with the consequences that it will ruin the Amhara region economically and drive a wedge between Fano and the Amhara people.
More than the military downsides, Fano’s lack of a unified command and common political manifesto prevents the transformation of its military successes into political leverage. In this regard, what jumps out first is the loss, despite its military victories, of Fano’s ability to negotiate, be it with the government or other political parties. For belligerent parties to start negotiating, the presentation of a united front reflecting shared demands and visions is an essential condition. Negotiation is impossible if one of the parties displays a divided leadership and disparate demands and proposals. Even if we put aside the possibility of negotiation with the government because most Fano leaders have dismissed it, rightly arguing that Abiy cannot be trusted, there remains the very critical matter of negotiation with other opposition parties.
It does not require a special acumen to understand the vital importance of Fano being able to approach opposition parties and other ethnic groups with a united front and an inclusive manifesto. Peace, the establishment of a participatory political system, and the formation of a national coalition wholly depend on opening dialogue with the peoples and political forces outside the Amhara region. Proposing an inclusive common manifesto opens the road to the formation of a broad national coalition for, in so doing, Fano hoists itself to the level of an alternative to the government in the eyes of the rest of Ethiopia.
It would be mistaken to think that the formation of a national coalition could come after Fano seized federal power. As pointed out by the group called Concerned Ethiopians, “the road to success is shorter if a broad coalition is formed” in conjunction with the ongoing military efforts to defeat Abiy’s army.” Seeing Abiy’s endeavor to frame the war as “Fano versus the rest of Ethiopia,” the formation of a national coalition effectively erodes his scheme. Additionally, if Fano does not reach out to non-Amhara peoples and political forces, “how can it be trusted to form a democratic coalition government after it grabbed the levers of power?”
Promising a democratic government after the seizure of power will not bring about confidence. The latter must be built through persistent dialogues with all the parties concerned, resulting in the drafting of an inclusive and approved manifesto. Refusal or delay to initiate dialogues gives the unfortunate feeling of déjà vu, that is, of military victors capturing power in Ethiopia and then imposing their will on the people. To commit to ending this pattern once and for all is to recognize that military victories do not give the right to decide on national matters without the consent of all concerned. This understanding must happen for Ethiopia to finally change course and enter the path leading to democracy.
This is to say that the cause of unity is a safeguard against extremism for Fano itself. To the extent that unity requires a give-and-take process, not only among the different Fano groups but also with non-Amhara ethnic groups, this consent-based approach offers the advantages of isolating extremists and empowering the moderate views of the majority. The willingness to accept and compose with other views demands democratic dispositions that disqualify extremism. Because the willingness embodies the concerns of other players, it mitigates power struggle and blocks the use of differences for the promotion of personal power or divisive policy. To undertake the construction of internal unity and a nationwide coalition is thus a self-cleansing process for Fano.
Nothing could boost more the confidence of the international community than Fano’s commitment and effort to build a nationwide coalition around an inclusive and democratic political agenda. Because such an agenda promises peace, power-sharing, and cooperative relations with neighboring countries, the international community will see Fano as a promising alternative to the existing government and will be easily willing to provide whatever support is needed. The unification of Fano will also bring to an end the divisions among the diaspora, given that Fano’s disunity is what feeds conflicts within the diaspora. With the termination of Fano’s divisions, the diaspora would have no choice but to speak in one voice, a change that could influence the international community to be more forthcoming in favor of Fano.
Unity: Which kind?
Acknowledging the importance of unity does not prevent us from debating on the kind of unity that would be appropriate for Fano to reach its goal. The second part of this paper has contrasted the pros and cons of a centralized, top-down political and military unity with those of a decentralized, bottom-up form of leadership. The result is that unity is indeed consequential, but it need not be the one that excludes diversity and institutes a tightly centralized and hierarchical system of command. The fear is that the adoption of this kind of authoritarian unity clashes with Fano’s promise, which is to lay the ground for a democratic future in Ethiopia. The condition for Fano to fulfill the promise is first to practice democracy internally.
Many analysts have proposed the processes and means that they deem necessary to overcome Fano’s sub-regional splits and establish one common political and military leadership. My intention here is not to discuss the proposals. Instead, I suggest that we accept the divisions as a fact and decline the thought habit compelling us to shy away from the management of diversity on the ground that it invites division and anarchy. The right approach is to move the discussion in the direction of asking the kind of unity that would reconcile sub-regional diversity with the requirement of a unified political and military command. In such a case, unity will function as a collaborative system, not as a top-down organization.
The suggested alternative could be materialized by the establishment of two committees at sub-regional and regional levels, the latter being composed of representatives from the sub-region of Gondar, Wollo, Gojjam, and Shoa. The number of committee members should be determined according to the needs on the ground, the important thing is that it ensures equality and genuine representations of all the groups involved. The regional committee could elect a chairperson for a determined time or allot the position on a rotating basis. The point is that all the subregions are equally represented, and no opportunity is given for one subgroup or a person from that group to dominate and marginalize the other units.
One urgent and crucial function of the regional committee is establishing a task force of experts to draft an inclusive manifesto spelling out Fano’s vision, direction, and roadmap. As already discussed, the manifesto must reflect the consensus reached among Fano leaders and the agreed guiding principles enabling Fano to reach out to allies and partners outside the Amhara region. It is important that the Fano leadership officializes the establishment of the task force and makes it clear that no other manifesto has its approval.
As it must have become quite clear by now, the goal is to introduce and ingrain into Fano’s working habits methods of solving issues democratically. Equal to the importance of Fano’s military victories is the building of protection against slides toward authoritarianism and dictatorship. Unless Ethiopia breaks the cycle of one authoritarianism replacing a previous one, especially the cycle of the personal dictatorship of narcissistic leaders, it will not make an iota of progress in solving its rolling problems. The sole promise of democracy and equality must no longer be allowed to ignite the precipitation to give our support, no matter who or which party makes the promise. Instead, we must counterbalance our eagerness to empower with a matching eagerness to set up means of controlling power.
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Staff Report, “At least 10 Fano factions in armed resistance in Amhara, new report, Curate Oromia, https://curateoromia.com/at-least-10-fano-factions-in-armed-resistance-in-amhara-new-report/
Tilahun Abere Chanie, “The Current Amhara Fano Resistance: Viewed from the Historical Military
Tradition of the Amhara People,” East African Journal of Arts and Sciences, vol. 7, no. 1, 2024 https://journals.eanso.org/index.php/eajass/article/view/1955
Concerned Ethiopians, “Fano’s Current Realities: Challenges, Prospects & Next Steps,” Concerned Ethiopians, https://www.concernedethiopians.org/independent-analysis/4966-fanos-current-realities-challenges-prospects-next-steps.html
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Mengistu Musie, “The Battle for Unity: The Real Struggle of the Amhara Fano vs. Diaspora Infighting,” The Habesha https://zehabesha.com/the-battle-for-unity-the-real-struggle-of-the-amhara-fano-vs-diaspora-infighting/
Mengistu Musie, “The Resilient Fano Movement: A contradiction to Koki Absolom’s Analysis,” Dinknesh Ethiopia, https://dinkneshethiopia.com/
Fano Lisan, “የፋኖ አንድነት ምክር ቤት አንደኛ አመት ምክንያት በማድረግ የተሰጠ መግለጫ” (ክፍል 1), https://fanolisan.org/31/
Prince Dr. Asfa-Wossen, “A Call for Unity and Cooperation among Fano Fighters,” The Habesha, https://zehabesha.com/a-call-for-unity-and-cooperation-among-fano-fighters/
Concerned Ethiopians, “Fano’s Current Realities,” Ibid.
Staff Report, “At least 10 Fano factions in armed resistance in Amhara, new report,” Ibid.
Concerned Ethiopians, “Fano’s Current Realities,” Ibid.
See ibid.
Professor Mesay Kebede is known for his contributions in the field of education, particularly in areas related to educational policy, development, and sociology. His work often focuses on issues such as access to education, equity, and the role of education in societal development. If you’re looking for specific information about his research, publications, or impact, feel free to specify!
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