Asymmetric Conflict In Somalia, Sudan: How It Affects Ethiopia | The Reporter Ethiopia

This week, Somalia’s national army announced it has taken control of the city of Baidowa in the country’s South West State.

Located just 150 miles north-west of the capital Mogadishu, Baidowa is a strategic city that has served as a base for international peacekeepers, including Ethiopian troops, and humanitarian agencies in an area affected by drought, conflict and displacement.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ordered a large contingent of troops to take over Baidowa following the South West State administration’s announcement of its intentions to sever relations with the federal government in Mogadishu, mimicking earlier moves by states like Jubaland, Puntland, and Somaliland, among others.

The military operation also came following the re-election of Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen, who was set to continue his seven-year tenure as president of the South West State for five additional years.

However, the federal intervention has forced Laftagareen to flee after resigning from his post on March 30, 2026.

The internal conflict and tensions between state administrations and the federal government in Somalia has led the African Union to call for restraint. Meanwhile, Mogadishu warns that acts of retaliation will not be tolerated.

Analysts predict the military force deployed in the South West State by Mogadishu could soon head to other breakaway jurisdictions. The strength of the military response has also led them to question why Mogadishu has been unable to override Al-Shabaab in the same way.

Many agree that Somalia’s newfound military strength is rooted in substantial support from Turkiye and Egypt. They observe Hassan Sheikh’s government utilized weaponry and other forms of military support from Ankara and Cairo in its bid to purge Laftagareen from Baidowa.

“Hassan Sheikh is now fully relying on Turkiye and Egypt for its security forces and the fight against Al-Shabaab. This is a major departure unfolding, given Somalia’s reliance on Ethiopian forces for so long,” said a geopolitical analyst based in Addis Ababa, who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

“Turkiye and Egypt are now committing themselves militarily to protect Hassan Sheikh’s government, in return for securing their strategic interests, which include undermining Ethiopia’s contribution to Somalia’s security and stability. Their move also undermines Ethiopia’s serious concerns about resurgence from Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia should keep a close eye on the dynamics in Somalia and stay alert, because Somalia’s internal conflicts could come closer to the Ethiopian border at some point,” cautions the analyst.

Meanwhile, on the other side of Ethiopia, the war in Sudan has already edged towards the Ethiopian border along the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State, which hosts the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Several parts of Sudan’s Blue Nile State, including Al-Kurmuk, Geissan, and Ed Damazin are seeing intense fighting as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launch offensives against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in a bid to regain a foothold in the region.

Over the past week, RSF and its ally the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), declared they have regained control of these areas, which are often seen as strategic for the illicit trade flows linking Ethiopia and Sudan, particularly in Kurmuk.

The Sudanese portion of Kurmuk is also considered a vital security chokepoint given its proximity to the Roseieres Dam—Sudan’s second-largest hydroelectric dam. Observers note that control over this area has the potential to tilt the tide of war, which has been raging now for three years, displacing more than 12 million people.

Analysts foresee that battles along the Sudan-Ethiopia border will continue, cautioning about impacts on Ethiopia.

This week also saw the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), a think-tank under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, publish a lengthy paper on the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood (MBH) in regional conflicts.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Sunni Islamist movement, maintaining presence in over 70 countries worldwide, since its establishment in 1928. The organization, which is largely viewed as a global Islamist network seeking a Sharia-governed order challenging democratic institutions and liberal norms, is thought to be embedded in the military, state, charity, and social structures of many countries.

In ‘The Evolving Influence of Muslim Brotherhood-Affiliated Networks at the Southern Red Sea’s ‘Triple Gate’: Sudan, Yemen, Somalia,’ IFA senior researcher Gashaw Ayferam (PhD) contends MBH has a strong presence in Sudan and Somalia.

The paper posits that while Egypt has proscribed the brotherhood in a bid to maintain relations with the US, Cairo is actively supporting MBH in Sudan and Somalia. It notes that Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and the SAF, which enjoy military backing from Egypt, maintain strong links to the brotherhood.

Recent reports indicate that MBH is moving from a hierarchical structure to a fragmented network of branches and affiliated civil institutions, particularly following declining support in the Middle East. They also suggest that despite overall global decline, the brotherhood is gaining influence in regions outside of its traditional Arab heartland, including Africa, Asia, and the west, primarily through social media and civil organizations.

The IFA paper notes that instability in the southern Red Sea, notably in Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia, has created space for recovery and consolidation. It argues that MBH has sought to occupy emerging power vacuums by embedding itself within political and military structures, while simultaneously receiving political and logistical support from Qatar, Turkey, and Iran.

Speaking to The Reporter in December 2025, Dr. Alaaeldin Awad Nogoud, official spokesperson for the Tasis government led by the RSF, claimed the Muslim Brotherhood is largely to blame for the continued conflict in Sudan.

“The reason Sudan’s conflict could not be stopped is because Egypt and SAF do not want to stop the war. Egypt continues to fuel chaos in Sudan by backing SAF until it establishes a Muslim Brotherhood regime. The reason is that only such a government can maintain Egypt’s strong interests over the Nile. Eritrea and Somalia are among those who have forged an alliance with SAF. This alliance also seeks to encircle Ethiopia. Egypt has SAF in place to protect its interests in Ethiopia, but should SAF fail, Egypt has prepared Somalia as a second option for influencing Ethiopia. So, Egypt has forced both north and south of Ethiopia,” said Nogoud.

He also stated that MBH maintains relations with extremist forces like Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, and IS, among others.

Analysts like Costantinos Berhutesfa (PhD), former AU anti-graft commissioner, urge the Ethiopian government to remain vigilant amid the volatility in the region.

“We [Ethiopia] need to have good relations with our neighboring countries. Somalia in particular is a big factor in Ethiopia’s national interest. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has mobilized the whole world against us because of the MoU [with Somaliland]. We must treat our neighbors with good caution,” he said.

Costantinos observes Egypt’s continued meddling in the Horn stems partly from domestic trouble.

“Egypt is encircling Ethiopia even though Egypt itself is in crisis. Egypt’s long-term strategy in the Gulf and Horn is now in serious doubt owing to the Middle East crisis. The situation in Iran, Israel, and Gaza have placed Egypt in a precarious position. Now, all extremist groups in the Gulf and Horn are rising up against American allies in the region,” he said. “Now, Egypt is acting frantically by supporting SAF, the Somali government, and Eritrea in a bid to influence Ethiopia from every direction. Cairo has said it will use every means to influence Ethiopia to gain an agreement over GERD.”

Another security analyst, however, cautions that danger for Ethiopia lies not only in encirclement but also in the potential infiltration of domestic politics.

“Egypt is creating an asymmetric war on Ethiopia, from two directions. They support Al-Burhan, and Hassan Sheikh. Internally in Ethiopia, Egypt reportedly supports armed groups. The Ethiopian government also accuses Egypt and Eritrea of supporting Fano, TPLF, and OLA. These allegations need concrete evidence, but when we observe these groups constantly receiving arms and enlisting new troops, we have to question where they’re getting the support from,” said the analyst, speaking anonymously.

“All of this indicates that Egypt is trying to get closer to Ethiopia via Somalia and Sudan. This is also subverting Ethiopia’s sea access interests. Egypt has no history of successful ground war campaigns, therefore it is relying heavily on proxy forces in Ethiopia’s neighboring countries.”

Still, other recent developments suggest there could still be room for peaceful solutions. Djibouti in particular is well positioned to facilitate re-engagement and ease tensions between Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, Khartoum, and others.

On March 12, 2026, PM Abiy Ahmed (PhD) and President Hassan Sheikh joined Djiboutian President Guelleh for an Iftar dinner that also featured several senior officials from all three countries.

Statements issued afterward suggested that discussions focused on the overall situation in the Horn of Africa, including peace and security, economic cooperation and the strengthening of regional integration.

The meeting also addressed the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and its potential economic repercussions for the region, including possible impacts on trade and stability.

The Djiboutian presidency said the meeting forms part of a series of high-level engagements aimed at defining a new strategic direction and strengthening cooperation among countries of the Horn of Africa in addressing shared political, security, and economic challenges.

The current AU Chairperson, former Djiboutian foreign minister Mahmoud Ali Youssoufmight also weigh in on the divisions in the Horn with efforts aimed at peace and collaboration.