Red Sea Pressures Intensified; Ethiopia’s Search For Access Reordering The Horn

On the eve of the New Year, diplomatic traffic through Addis Ababa has intensified in ways that appear routine on the surface but, upon closer inspection, reveal a region under growing strategic strain.

Ethiopia hosted the presidents of Somalia and Kenya within days of each other as tensions resurfaced along Somaliland’s northern coast near Zeila, while Sudan’s war deepened further into what humanitarian agencies now describe as the world’s gravest humanitarian catastrophe. At the same time, drought warnings returned across the eastern Horn, reviving fears of another cycle of displacement and food insecurity.

Taken separately, each development may be construed as another episode in a region long accustomed to instability. But, taken together? Analysts say they point to something more consequential, that Ethiopia’s unresolved quest for reliable access to the Red Sea is no longer a dormant geopolitical concern, rather it is actively reshaping diplomatic alignments, security calculations, and humanitarian risks across the Horn of Africa.

“What has changed is not Ethiopia’s geography, but the pressure surrounding it,” said a Horn of Africa analyst speaking with The Reporter anonymously, as this week also saw Egypt stepping into the Red Sea equation with what seems to be full commitment.

The clearest signal indicating the Horn is undergoing a reordering and of the intensifications of the simmering pressures came not from Addis Ababa but from Cairo.

On December 25, The National, the UAE’s state-run daily newspaper based in Abu Dhabi, reported that Egypt had quietly concluded agreements to develop and upgrade two strategically located ports on the Red Sea: Assab in Eritrea and Doraleh in Djibouti.

Both ports lie near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea and one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints. According to sources cited by the paper, the agreements go beyond commercial upgrades and include the creation of berths capable of hosting warships, provisions for re-fuelling and resupplying Egypt’s southern fleet, as well as the option to deploy small but elite military contingents.

Egyptian officials reportedly view the deals as legitimizing an expanded military presence in both countries. Egyptian warships, sources say, are already frequent visitors.

For Ethiopia, the implications are immediate and uncomfortable. More than 90 percent of its maritime trade passes through Djibouti, particularly via Doraleh port.

A policy brief paper published last month by Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and authored by Mohammed Seid (PhD), an expert on the Middle East, reiterates that Ethiopia’s transition from a littoral to a landlocked state witnessed a fundamental shift from strategic autonomy to survival and this according to the paper has left the country to economic vulnerability, structural dependency and national security risk.

Analysts also contend that Egypt’s move this week inserts a rival strategic actor into Ethiopia’s most critical commercial artery at a time when relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa remain frozen over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Egypt has repeatedly framed Ethiopia’s dam as an existential threat to its water security and Cairo has consistently opposed any scenario in which landlocked states gain a territorial foothold on the Red Sea. Experts note that with negotiations over the GERD stalled for more than two years now, Cairo’s expanding Red Sea footprint signals a shift away from bilateral dam diplomacy and toward regional leverage. This broader contest over access, influence, and chokepoints now frames nearly every diplomatic interaction in the Horn.

Further south, reports emerged on December 16 of renewed tensions around Zeila, a historic port town on Somaliland’s northern coast near the Djibouti border. Somaliland-based media and regional security analysts spoke of heightened alert levels and diplomatic unease. Even as no formal Ethiopian military or commercial presence was announced, the response from Mogadishu was swift and unequivocal.

Somali officials reiterated their rejection of any unilateral arrangements involving Somaliland’s coastline, warning against actions that could undermine Somalia’s territorial sovereignty. The statements were familiar, but the timing was not accidental.

As of now there are no official documents or statements indicating that Zeila is Ethiopia’s primary commercial objective. That distinction still belongs to Berbera, Somaliland’s most developed port and the centerpiece of Ethiopia’s earlier memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities.

Yet Zeila’s symbolism appears potent. It sits at the intersection of unresolved regional fault lines: Somalia’s fragmented sovereignty, Somaliland’s long-standing bid for recognition, Djibouti’s strategic sensitivities, and Ethiopia’s determination to reduce its reliance on a single maritime corridor.

For Addis Ababa, the issue is existential rather than opportunistic. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been landlocked, depending overwhelmingly on Djibouti for maritime access. Every disruption of any kind including political, logistical, or financial has reinforced a consensus within Ethiopia’s security and economic establishment that redundancy is no longer optional.

As Costantinos Berhe (PhD), a seasoned economic and political analyst, put it, “There is nothing definitive or conclusively established at this point. We have not heard that the Somaliland project has been cancelled.”

He notes that although Somaliland is not a formally recognized state, it has existed independently for over 30 years and has demonstrated a relatively strong democratic system.

“Moreover, it has remained separate from Somalia itself,” he told The Reporter. “Therefore, the understanding [MoU]  Ethiopia reached with Somaliland does not appear to have been annulled. Certainly, Somalia has repeatedly lodged objections, but we have seen Ethiopia and Somalia engage in negotiations, even mediated as far as Turkey, and return to more peaceful engagement. So, dialogue appears to be what is needed, and it seems the government is pursuing that path”.

Within days of the Zeila reports, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Addis Ababa on December 22, marking his fourth visit to Ethiopia in less than two years. Official statements highlighted cooperation on counterterrorism, security coordination, and regional stability. Absent from the communiqués but believed to be central to the visit was the Red Sea question.

Since Ethiopia signed its memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities two years ago, Somalia has increasingly framed Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as a political and sovereignty challenge rather than a neutral economic pursuit. While Addis Ababa insists it seeks access through lawful and negotiated means, Mogadishu fears that any normalization of Ethiopian port access via Somaliland could weaken Somalia’s already fragile federal authority.

An HoA analyst speaking with The Reporter was blunt in his assessment of the balance of control. “As for Hassan Sheikh [Mohamud], he has repeatedly come forward on this issue. First of all, Somalia does not control Somaliland, nor has it been able to control even its own capital city. So, at that level, this is how the situation stands.”

Diplomats familiar with the Addis talks describe the visit less as a breakthrough than as containment diplomacy, an effort by both sides to prevent escalation while their core disagreements remain unresolved. Experts note that Somalia needs Ethiopian military cooperation against Al-Shabaab and Ethiopia needs Somalia calm while it continues to explore strategic alternatives to Djibouti and in the wider Horn.

Analysts contend that the relationship of the two countries is increasingly defined by necessity rather than trust.

Just two days ahead of Hassan Sheikh’s visit, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) hosted Kenyan President William Ruto in Addis Ababa. Unlike Somalia, Kenya does not see Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions as a direct sovereignty challenge. Instead, Nairobi has positioned itself as a stabilizing buffer, offering cooperation through regional corridors and multilateral forums while quietly expanding its diplomatic footprint in the Horn.

Kenya’s interests appear to be pragmatic. Descalating Ethiopia–Somalia tensions risk spillover into its own security environment, particularly along its Somali border. At the same time, Kenya sees an opportunity to assert itself as a regional broker at a moment when Sudan has collapsed and Eritrea remains largely isolated.

Projects such as the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, long delayed but never abandoned, regain relevance whenever Red Sea tensions intensify. While such corridors cannot replace direct maritime access, they provide Ethiopia with leverage—and Kenya with influence—in a region undergoing recalibration.

On the other hand If Somaliland represents Ethiopia’s most flexible maritime option, Eritrea remains its most sensitive one. Addis Ababa has openly stated its interest in access to the Assab port, a move that immediately raises historical and security alarms.

“A port is not merely about cargo transport,” Costantinos explained. “Ports involve industrial parks, special economic zones, and serve as hubs where we can produce and export significant volumes of goods.”

He added that the Red Sea’s volatility makes access a strategic insurance policy.

“Because the Red Sea region is perpetually volatile, such access would be something Ethiopia could use to safeguard its national interests,” said the expert.

Yet he stressed that there is no indication Ethiopia seeks this access through force.

“There is no indication at the governmental level that this would involve launching a war against the Eritrean government. Even now, it appears to be something Ethiopia seeks to pursue through peaceful means,” said Costantinos.

He stated that reports that Eritrea is mobilizing its population for war seem and remain unverified.

“But how true is that? That remains a questionable matter,” he asked.

Egypt’s decision to upgrade Assab, however, complicates the equation further, effectively inserting Cairo into a space Ethiopia once viewed as a potential bilateral negotiation.

Conversely, if Ethiopia’s eastern and southern diplomacy is driven by caution, its western frontier is shaped by absence. Sudan’s civil war has removed Khartoum as a regional actor altogether.

“Sudan is almost becoming among those referred to as a collapsed state,” said an analyst. “Because foreign powers have intervened there, I personally do not believe Sudan will return to peace anytime soon.”

He described a conflict sustained by external backing, looted gold, and an endless supply of weapons.

“As long as these two Sudanese warring parties continue to receive foreign support, they will not run out of weapons.”

For Ethiopia, the consequences extend beyond humanitarian concern. Sudan once represented a strategic counterweight, a neighbour with Red Sea access, agricultural potential, and diplomatic weight. According to the expert, that anchor is now gone, narrowing Ethiopia’s options just as its urgency grows.

Overlaying these geopolitical pressures is a worsening humanitarian reality. As diplomacy intensified in December, aid agencies warned of renewed drought conditions across eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Kenya.

“Climate shocks do not create geopolitical conflict, but they accelerate it. States under humanitarian strain have less tolerance for diplomatic ambiguity,” said the expert. “Aid competition hardens political positions. Fragile societies become less forgiving of perceived external threats.”

Somalia, Costantinos noted, has endured more than three decades of crisis. Sudan now ranks first globally in displacement and food insecurity. South Sudan, too, is sliding back toward conflict following the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar and other senior government officials this year.

“In the East African region, something could erupt at any time,” he warned. “However, it appears that governments are aware of this risk and are giving it serious consideration.”

Experts and analysts alike agree that what emerges from the final weeks of December in the Horn region is not a single turning point, but a pattern. Ethiopia’s geography, unchanged for more than three decades, has become newly intolerable under modern pressures including global supply disruptions, Red Sea militarization, regional state collapse, and climate stress.

Neighbors are adjusting accordingly. Somalia engages defensively. Kenya mediates strategically. Sudan disappears. Somaliland advances cautiously. Egypt tightens its maritime grip. And Ethiopia presses forward, aware that delay carries its own risks.

“The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved,” Costantinos argued, pointing to the limits of sub-regional mechanisms. “IGAD should now play a major role in bringing these governments together. The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved, especially since Eritrea has withdrawn from IGAD membership. It is possible Eritrea believes IGAD is biased toward Ethiopia because its leadership is Ethiopian.”

Experts speaking with The Reporter contend that the Horn of Africa is not being reshaped by grand treaties or summits, rather it is being reordered by pressures of the economic, environmental, and strategic kind. The Red Sea sits at the center of that pressure, not as a destination, but as a question Ethiopia can no longer afford to leave unanswered.