Europe’s “Distorted” Bet On Cairo Raises Furore, Questions In Addis Ababa

“Europe once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.”

Ethiopia watched in incredulity last week as the European Union and Egypt launched the second phase of a seven-year cooperation program in what that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described as a “deeply disappointing and problematic” move by Brussels to deepen its involvement in the long-running dispute over the use of Nile Waters.

The new Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021–2027 elevates Cairo as the EU’s primary partner in North Africa, linking European investment and migration policy to Egypt’s stability and energy infrastructure.

The updated programme, unveiled in Cairo earlier this week, includes additional billions of Euros in funding. Although it was presented as part of a broader regional vision linking North Africa and Europe through renewable energy, green hydrogen, and climate adaptation, its geographic scope has tilted heavily toward Egypt and touches sensitive Ethiopian interests, particularly water governance and energy trade.

A joint statement issued by Cairo and Brussels on October 24, 2025, echoed Egypt’s colonial and monopolistic claims on the Nile, with the EU appearing to take a clear position on the dispute with Ethiopia for the first time.

“Recognizing Egypt’s heavy reliance on the Nile River in a context of its water scarcity, the EU reiterates its support to Egypt’s water security and the compliance with international law, including concerning the Ethiopian Dam. The EU strongly encourages transboundary cooperation among riparian countries based on the principles of prior notification, cooperation and ‘do no harm,’” it reads.

The programme comes less than two months after Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, according to the Ethiopian embassy in Brussels, “shows a complete disregard for the views and interests of other riparian countries.”

The embassy noted that the River Nile, shared by eleven riparian countries, cannot be treated through a bilateral framework that ignores nearly half a billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa.

“It is regrettable that the EU decided to undermine Ethiopia in a bilateral platform with Egypt,” reads the embassy’s response, accusing Brussels of adopting a “biased and hostile position” contrary to the spirit of its long-standing partnership with Addis Ababa.

Analysts speaking with The Reporter say the deal, while framed as development cooperation, carries strategic undertones that could tilt regional influence in favor of Cairo at a sensitive moment in the Horn and Nile Basin politics.

The Ethiopian statement marked one of the country’s sharpest diplomatic responses toward the European Union in recent years. It said the EU’s position contradicted international water law, particularly the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization enshrined in the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).

 “The EU’s distorted take on international law is deplorable,” it reads, adding that the bloc’s statement runs counter to the very frameworks it has supported elsewhere in Africa.

The statement further noted that Europe’s approach ignored its own history as an observer in the African Union–facilitated negotiations on GERD—talks in which EU representatives had witnessed all parties’ concerns and interests firsthand.

A Horn affairs expert speaking with The Reporter anonymously echoed the country’s sentiments.

“What the bloc did last week was like shooting your own foot. The EU has long anchored itself as a strong ally of regional integration. How does siding with one and accusing the other about a matter of this magnitude cement its longstanding argument? It might not look like it from an outsider’s perspective but Ethiopia has many allies, especially in this continent,” the expert said.

Ethiopia’s government has spent more than a decade promoting its image as a driver of regional connectivity. GERD was marketed not merely as a national project, but as a continental one, a source of affordable electricity for the region and a symbol of African self-reliance.

The EU’s new deal with Egypt, however, pours fresh funds into Cairo’s National Water Resources Plan 2037 and irrigation modernization efforts, without reference to transboundary cooperation in the Nile Basin. For officials in Addis, this silence cuts deep.

“It is difficult to see how the EU can claim to support regional integration while financing projects that reinforce unilateral control of shared waters,” says an Ethiopian analyst who requested anonymity. “The same Europe that preaches partnership in Addis signs deals in Cairo that exclude upstream voices.”

This week, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared before Parliament and delivered an address that resonated far beyond domestic politics. The PM reiterated his administration’s “Two Waters” policy, which revolves around GERD and the Nile, maritime access, and resource sovereignty.

Abiy’s words offered a window into the country’s growing frustration.

“Our demand is not new or emotional,” he told lawmakers. “It is a question of national existence, a matter of survival.”

On maritime access, the Prime Minister reiterated that “the manner in which Ethiopia lost its access to the sea was illegal and unjust,” adding that “Ethiopia can no longer remain in the status quo of being a ‘geographical prisoner.’”

He insisted, however, that any resolution would be peaceful.

”We don’t believe that war and conflict are necessary to achieve this. That is why we have been waiting patiently for five years,” said Abiy.

Experts argue that the timing of the EU–Egypt deal appears to sharpen Ethiopia’s frustration over what officials describe as “selective engagement” by external actors.

While Egypt is portrayed as a stable partner in the Mediterranean, Ethiopia’s broader development agenda, they argue, continues to be viewed through a crisis lens.

Under MIP 2021–2027, the EU commits hundreds of millions of Euros between 2021 and 2024 to projects in green transition, water management, and economic resilience.

The plan positions Egypt as Europe’s anchor state for investment and migration control — a gateway for renewable energy trade, digital connectivity, and climate cooperation across the southern Mediterranean.

Some analysts argue that the EU issued the joint statement in an attempt to sideline Ethiopia or other riparian countries from shared resources as a result of Europe’s apparent conviction that only Egypt can offer the predictability, scale, and access it desires in a turbulent region.

To Ethiopian observers, that logic is precisely the problem. By prioritizing predictability over partnership, the EU risks alienating countries that are equally vital to Africa’s integration but less convenient to manage.

The deal’s omission of Nile Basin cooperation, in particular, is glaring. Ethiopia’s USD five billion GERD remains Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, designed to serve multiple countries through power exports.

Yet, in the EU’s water-governance portfolio for North Africa, Ethiopia is nowhere to be found.

“This is not simply a funding decision,” argues an Ethiopian water policy expert. “It’s a diplomatic statement that Europe’s engagement on transboundary resources stops at Egypt’s borders.”

The EU–Egypt partnership also extends to migration control. This is another area where Ethiopia feels its leverage slipping. The joint statement on migration and security places Cairo at the center of Europe’s southern containment strategy, tasking Egypt with managing irregular flows toward the Mediterranean.

Through this arrangement, the EU channels funding for border management, surveillance, and asylum-system development, which were priorities that once formed the core of EU cooperation with the Horn of Africa under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

For Ethiopia, the reallocation is tangible. Between 2016 and 2021, EU migration funding helped support reintegration programs, job creation for returnees, and local development projects in migration-prone areas like Amhara and Tigray. Those channels have since dried up.

“Europe is outsourcing migration control northward,” said the Horn affairs expert. “We used to be part of the conversation. Now Egypt is the conversation.”

The shift has strategic consequences. With the EU’s attention fixed on North Africa, the Horn’s voice in shaping migration policy is fading, just as irregular flows from Ethiopia and Sudan to Libya are surging, analysts contend.

Energy cooperation is another pillar where Ethiopia’s ambitions collide with the EU’s Cairo-centric vision. Under the MIP, Europe plans to invest in Egypt’s Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy, emphasizing renewables, hydrogen, and electricity interconnection with the Mediterranean.

Projects like the MEDUSA, a major high-capacity fiber optic initiative linking Southern Europe and North Africa, set to land in Port Said by 2027, epitomize this new alignment. Europe’s future energy corridor to Africa now runs through Egypt—not the Horn.

Ethiopia, meanwhile, has staked its economic future on becoming a renewable energy exporter, leveraging hydropower from the GERD and other dams. Officials had hoped the EU members would view the Horn as a key green-energy hub.

However, experts point out that the optics instead suggest that Europe is doubling down on existing trade corridors rather than building new ones across the continent.

“The EU talks about a green partnership with Africa, but its investments follow the same old geography, the Mediterranean first, Sub-Saharan Africa later,” said one analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

The irony is sharp. Ethiopia, whose entire development narrative rests on green growth and clean energy, now finds itself overlooked in favor of projects in Cairo.

Relations between Ethiopia and the European Union have been fragile since the northern conflict in 2020. Though ties improved after the Pretoria Agreement, tensions remain over humanitarian access, governance reforms, and accountability.

Following the peace agreement, there has been a “warming up” of relations, with high-level meetings between EU officials and the Ethiopian government. A significant development was the signing of a ‘Global Gateway’ Partnership Agreement in October 2025, which aims to boost cooperation and investment in key sectors.

While the EU suspended direct budget support to the Ethiopian government during the peak of the war, it continued humanitarian aid to the population. European aid to Ethiopia, once exceeding a billion Euros annually, has not fully recovered. Addis Ababa’s access to comparable funding mechanisms has diminished, particularly as the EU redirects attention to the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean.

Since the 2022 peace deal, the EU has gradually reinstated development financing, focusing on post-conflict reconstruction, health services, education, and food security. This includes a 240 million Euro grant under the 2024 Annual Action Programme (AAP-2024) in April 2025, and a 90 million Euro financing agreement for AAP-2025 in October 2025. These funds target development in areas such as agribusiness, digitalization, and the restoration of basic services in conflict-affected regions. 

Against this backdrop, the EU–Egypt partnership feels to many Ethiopians like a diplomatic downgrading. It contrasts sharply with the EU’s earlier role as a mediator and developmental ally during Ethiopia’s reform years between 2018 and 2020.

A senior foreign relations expert puts it bluntly: “Europe once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.”

For many Ethiopians, at the heart of the matter also lies a contradiction between Europe’s rhetoric and its regional conduct. The EU’s New Agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbourhood frame the Union as a partner for African integration, inclusive growth, and shared prosperity.

Yet, the geographic concentration of funding being overwhelmingly in North Africa reinforces rather than bridges Africa’s north–south divide, according to observers.

In Ethiopia, this is seen as hypocrisy. Officials recall how European diplomats routinely call for “African solutions to African problems.” But when it comes to the Nile, Europe funds one side’s adaptation and leaves the other’s aspirations unaddressed.

“The EU’s credibility as a promoter of regional integration is at stake,” says a political expert speaking anonymously. “If integration only means connecting North Africa to Europe, then what is Africa’s role?”

For Addis Ababa, the EU’s move comes at a delicate time. Ethiopia is reasserting its regional leadership, expanding ties with the Gulf, and seeking new maritime and trade outlets through the Red Sea.

Abiy Ahmed’s recent parliamentary remarks capture the urgency of that quest.

“We did not build our maritime [capacity] to put it in a glass of water,” said the Prime Minister, as he held up a glass half-full of water in front of lawmakers.

Analysts note that the Prime Minister’s insistence on peaceful means is both a reassurance and a warning: Ethiopia will not abandon its pursuit of access to the sea, but it prefers diplomacy over confrontation.

Still, they contend that Ethiopia’s room for maneuver is narrowing. With Eritrea unyielding, Djibouti heavily commercialized, and Somalia entangled in its own crises, Ethiopia needs credible partners.

Europe, once viewed as a bridge to consensus, now appears aligned elsewhere.

The EU’s partnership with Egypt is also reshaping continental diplomacy. Foreign relations experts note that Egypt’s dual identity as both Arab and African allows it to operate in two arenas at once, a flexibility that Addis Ababa, despite hosting the African Union, cannot easily replicate.

“If Europe channels more investment and policy coordination through Egypt, the African Union itself could feel the ripple. Egypt’s influence within continental institutions may rise, while the Horn’s strategic weight could diminish,” said one analyst.

This dynamic is not lost on Ethiopian policymakers. Despite the strong language, the Ethiopian statement concluded on a constructive note, saying the country “looks forward to engaging the EU and its member states to rectify the gross and wrongful positions reflected in the ‘Joint Statement.’”

In diplomatic terms, analysts say that this suggests Ethiopia is not seeking confrontation but recalibration, a signal that dialogue remains open, provided Europe acknowledges Ethiopia’s rights and contributions.

Observers note this balanced assertiveness could mark a turning point in Ethiopia’s diplomacy with the EU, combining principled firmness with an invitation to reset the relationship.

As the EU–Egypt partnership deepens through 2027, Europe’s engagement with Africa appears increasingly defined by geography, migration, and security interests rather than shared development vision.

For Ethiopia, the challenge will be to navigate this changing landscape—protecting its interests on the Nile, maintaining strategic partnerships, and asserting its leadership within the African Union.