Horn And Gulf: Shifting Tides

Saudi Arabia’s bombing of United Arab Emirates (UAE) positions in Yemen, Somalia’s decision to close its airspace to UAE planes, and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s regaining control over Khartoum all seem to signal trouble for Abu Dhabi’s ambitions for a more expansive role in the Horn and Gulf.

The developments coincide with unrest in Iran, and an increasingly tense standoff between Washington and Tehran. Analysts posit the outcomes of these events could have far reaching reverberations across the world, and argue they shed light on the extent of Middle Eastern influence in the Horn of Africa.

They characterize the developments as a “strategic retreat” on the part of the UAE, explaining that Saudi and the UAE are highly unlikely to engage in a conflict for fear of creating a crisis in the Arab world.

However, analysts warn the cascading effects of decisions made in the Middle East and in Washington could have massive consequences for the Horn, including in determining the fate of Somaliland, among other things.

In an interview with Algeria this week, Somalia’s state minister of foreign affairs, Ali Omar, explained Somalia has taken the drastic measure of cutting all ties with the UAE.

“By any objective measure, the decision taken by Somalia’s cabinet on January 12 to annul all agreements with the United Arab Emirates was neither abrupt nor reckless. It came after prolonged restraint, repeated diplomatic engagement, and a sober assessment of what any responsible government is ultimately obliged to defend: its sovereignty, constitutional order, and national unity,” he said.

The diplomat accused Abu Dhabi of violating Somali airspace by smuggling “fugitive” Yemeni separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi through his country, describing the act as the “last straw” that pushed Mogadishu to sever relations with the UAE.

The decision came amid reports of growing cooperation between the UAE and Somaliland, whose recognition by Israel has caused an uproar in Somalia.

During the interview, Ali accused unnamed foreign forces of being behind the weakening ties between Mogadishu and regions like Jubaland, Puntland and Somaliland.

To Costantinos Berhutesfa (PhD), a political economy analyst, pointed to the powers that have an active interest in securing a military foothold in Somaliland.

“For the US and Israel, recognizing Somaliland is the number-one option for fighting extremists in the region, especially in Yemen. All Horn countries are either unstable or in crisis, and only Somaliland appears ideal for US and Israeli military bases. The US also fears if its base in Djibouti is compromised, it won’t have an alternative. So, they have no option but to recognize Somaliland and relocate their bases there,” said Costantinos.

Another potential impact of the fallout between Saudi and UAE concerns Eritrea.

Asmara has been aligned with Egypt, Saudi, and Al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), with some reports claiming that Eritrea is actively providing military support to the SAF. The war in Sudan, which is nearing its fourth year, has presented an opportunity and leverage to remain relevant and linked to Cairo, Riyadh, and others.

By embedding itself within the SAF’s external support network, Eritrea gains access to a regional arena where Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other actors are already deeply invested. Sudan thus becomes a staging ground for Eritrea’s attempt to enhance its geopolitical relevance beyond what its material capabilities would otherwise allow.

This positioning also explains the sharp rhetorical turn against the UAE. Once a pragmatic partner, Abu Dhabi is now cast as the central spoiler in Sudan and, by extension, the wider Horn and Gulf region. Eritrea’s antagonism toward the UAE mirrors broader tensions in Middle Eastern geopolitics, particularly as Sudan exposes divergent Gulf interests.

The RSF is widely perceived as enjoying Emirati backing, while the SAF draws support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Following its fallout with Abu Dhabi, Asmara has sought to realign itself within this constellation, using the Sudan file to cultivate closer ties with actors positioned against Emirati influence.

Isaias’s repeated denunciations of the UAE should thus be read less as moral condemnation than as a strategic recalibration within an increasingly polarized regional environment, according to analysts.

“Saudi and the UAE are trying to give Assab to somebody, but they fear Ethiopia. Assab is useless without Ethiopia. What is worrying for Ethiopia are the collaboration emerging between Eritrea and some armed groups in Ethiopia and the TPLF,” says Costantinos. “Egypt is reportedly financing Eritrea and armed groups in Ethiopia.”

Developments in Djibouti seem to place Ethiopia in an even more precarious position.

This week, a delegation led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) visited the port of Doraleh for discussions with Djiboutian president Ismael Omar Guelleh. The trip came just a few weeks after Egypt’s deputy PM Kamel El-Wazir and Djibouti’s Hassan Houmed signed a strategic agreement revolving around Doraleh.

Analysts see the move as part of a strategy by Cairo to block off port access for Ethiopia, pointing to similar agreements with Eritrea and Somalia.

“If Egypt controls Horn ports, then it affects Ethiopia in two ways. First, Egypt will supply illegal arms to armed groups in Ethiopia without any control through the ports. Second, Egypt will seize arms that the Ethiopian government is attempting to import,” said Costantinos.

However, he argues that Djibouti is not a lost cause.

“Djibouti is also trying to fall in the camps of Egypt and Somalia. But Djibouti will go nowhere. Djibouti cannot survive without Ethiopia. The main issue is, Djibouti fears Eritrea. Eritrea has previously tried to snatch Djibouti’s islands of Ras Dumera. At the time, it was Ethiopian forces who intervened and saved Djibouti. Now, Djibouti is not sure Ethiopia can provide such a guarantee. Currently, it is Egypt who has control over Asmara. Therefore, Djibouti is leaning on Cairo to secure a safety guarantee that Eritrea will not attack Djibouti. Djibouti reached an agreement with Egypt but I don’t think it will hand over full control of its ports,” said Costantinos.

While some express hope that subsiding influence from the UAE and other third parties could mean peace for conflict-ridden proxies like Sudan, others caution the end is not yet in sight for war in Sudan and Yemen.

Observers urge the Ethiopian government to focus on affirming domestic stability and internal coherence as it attempts to maneuver deftly through the region’s rising currents.

“Egypt’s intentional failure to accept GERD’s case is manifesting in Cairo’s move to encircle Ethiopia. Egypt’s systemic control over Horn of Africa countries economically, politically and militarily, will affect Ethiopia. Hence, Ethiopia needs to turn the tides, outdo Egypt’s diplomacy, and recreate the collaborative spirit among the Horn countries,” said a former diplomat currently working for an international organization based in Addis Ababa.

He wants to see Ethiopia take part in transactional diplomacy with the US and Israel as a way to access some leverage.

“If Egypt’s proxies in the Horn forge alliances with domestic forces in Ethiopia, the outcome would be dangerous,” he said. “Ethiopia was wise in keeping silent about Somaliland recognition following Israel’s announcement. But silently, Ethiopia needs to work on the MoU in the background.”

He also hinted at Cairo’s limitations, pointing to a speech this week by Egyptian leader Abdel Fatta el-Sisi, who addressed the Egyptian public with Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud standing by his side.

In the speech, El-Sisi focused on the instability in Mohamud’s country.

“Somalia has been ravaged for the last 30 years. Any challenge can be faced as long as the state is stable. When a country enters a state of conflict and insecurity, the way back to stability is difficult. They can not exit easily. It takes 20-30 years. I do not know if this upsets my brother president [Hassan Sheikh]but I say this to the Egyptian people: If Somalia grew by one billion dollars annually, they could have been developed in these 30 years. But now, they have to start from zero, to reconstruct, develop. Somalia lost hugely in these conflict years. These words are for the Egyptian people,” said El-Sisi.

To the former diplomat, the words carried insights into Egypt’s own political problems.

“El-Sisi is telling Egyptians that if he doesn’t stay in power, Egypt will descend into a crisis and become like Somalia. Egypt has its own internal problems. It is not like it is exporting conflict to Ethiopia and positioning itself as a guardian of Horn of Africa countries,” he said.

He foresees the next steps taken by the US and Israel, the possibility of a new axis in the Gulf, and the decisions made by the Horn’s leaders will determine where the story goes.

“If the US and Israel undertake fundamental attacks on Iran, many extremist groups will face a decline. If Iran falls, extremist groups like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, the Houthis, and others will fall or at least deteriorate. If Iran falls, then the US and Israel will become highly influential in the Gulf and Horn regions. If the extremists’ and the Muslim Brotherhood’s hands are cut off, then Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan might find peace. If the Horn finds peace, then Egypt and Eritrea will have no leverage. Hence, Ethiopia must ensure domestic stability, and then emerge as a regional stabilizer,” said the former diplomat.