Reform Or Irrelevance: The AU’s Choice

As the 39th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly opens in Addis Ababa under the theme “Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems to Achieve the Goals of Agenda 2063,” the continent’s leaders face a sobering reality: the AU’s institutional machinery is not yet fit for purpose. Water and sanitation are critical development priorities, but they cannot be achieved in isolation. Peace and security remain the bedrock of Agenda 2063, and without institutional reform, the AU will continue to struggle both in preventing conflict at home and in bargaining effectively abroad—particularly within the G20 forum, where Africa’s collective voice must be amplified.

The AU was created to be more than a successor to the Organization of African Unity. It was designed to be proactive, to intervene in crises, and to protect citizens from violence and instability. Yet its Peace and Security Council (PSC), the body tasked with this mission, has too often been reactive, constrained by political divisions among member states, inadequate funding, and limited enforcement capacity. From the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, conflicts have exposed the AU’s inability to act decisively. Institutional reform is therefore not optional—it is imperative if the AU is to fulfill its mandate.

One of the most glaring weaknesses is financial dependence. The AU relies heavily on external donors—primarily the European Union, the United States, and China—for its peace operations and programs. This compromises autonomy and delays responses to crises. Reform must first and foremost target sustainable financing. As such member states are obliged to meet their financial obligations. Innovative mechanisms such as import levies or continental solidarity funds should be explored towards this end. Without financial independence, the AU will remain beholden to external agendas, unable to act with urgency when African lives are at stake.

Another weakness lies in enforcement. The AU has adopted such ambitious norms as the principle of non-indifference, which allows intervention in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Yet enforcement has been inconsistent. Political will is often lacking, with powerful member states shielding allies or resisting scrutiny. Hence, the PSC’s authority ought to be strengthened to ensure that decisions are binding and not subject to endless political bargaining. Clearer mechanisms for accountability—both for member states and AU officials—are essential to restore credibility.

Coordination between the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) also requires overhaul. The principle of subsidiarity, which allows RECs to take the lead in regional crises, has created confusion and duplication. In West Africa, ECOWAS has sometimes acted independently of the AU, while in East Africa, IGAD has struggled to align with continental frameworks. It is therefore of the essence to streamline coordination, clarifying roles and responsibilities to avoid turf wars. A stronger AU should serve as the central hub, setting standards and providing resources, while RECs act as operational arms. Otherwise, Africa’s peace architecture risks fragmentation.

It is also incumbent on the AU to invest in early warning and preventive diplomacy. Too often, interventions occur after conflicts have escalated and exacted catastrophic human and economic costs. Although the Continental Early Warning System is operational, it remains underutilized, hampered by poor data collection and limited political follow-through. Reform should strengthen this system, integrating modern technology, local intelligence, and rapid response mechanisms. Preventive diplomacy must be prioritized, with mediators empowered to act before crises spiral out of control. Silence in the face of looming conflict is not neutrality—it is negligence.

Institutional reform must further address inclusivity. The AU has been criticized for being too state-centric, with limited engagement of civil society, women, and youth. Yet these groups are often the most affected by conflict and the most active in peacebuilding. Their participation should thus be institutionalized to ensure that peace processes are not monopolized by political elites. A more inclusive AU would not only be more legitimate but also more effective in addressing the root causes of instability.

Beyond the continent, reform is equally critical for Africa’s bargaining power within the G20. Though Africa is now a permanent member of the forum, representation alone is not enough. To bargain effectively within the G20 forum, the AU must speak with one voice, backed by institutional coherence and credibility. Fragmentation weakens Africa’s negotiating position, allowing external powers to play member states against one another. Ergo institutional reform must enhance the AU’s capacity to coordinate positions, articulate continental priorities, and ensure that Africa’s interests—whether in climate finance, debt restructuring, or trade—are advanced collectively. A reformed AU can transform Africa’s seat at the G20 from symbolic presence into substantive influence.

The theme of this year’s Assembly—water and sanitation—offers a reminder that peace and security are inseparable from development. Resource scarcity, particularly water, is increasingly a driver of conflict across Africa. From the Nile Basin to the Sahel, disputes over access to water exacerbate tensions and fuel violence. This calls for integrating peace and security with sustainable development in recognition of the fact that recognizing that addressing resource conflicts is as vital as mediating political disputes. Agenda 2063’s lofty goals will remain out of reach unless the AU can prevent resource wars and promote equitable access.

Critics may argue that reform is unrealistic given Africa’s diversity and the sovereignty concerns of member states. Sovereignty cannot be an excuse for inaction though. The AU was created precisely to transcend narrow national interests in pursuit of continental solidarity. Reform is not about weakening sovereignty; it is about strengthening collective security and bargaining power. If member states continue to resist reform, they risk condemning the AU to irrelevance, leaving Africa vulnerable to perpetual cycles of conflict and external manipulation.

The leaders convening in Addis Ababa for 39th Ordinary Session of the AU are duty-bound to confront the uncomfortable truth: the AU, in its current form, is not fully equipped to deliver on its mandate. Institutional reform is not optional; it is imperative. Financial independence, stronger enforcement, streamlined coordination, preventive diplomacy, inclusivity, and integration with development are the pillars of a reformed AU capable of promoting peace and security and bargaining effectively within the G20. Without these reforms, the AU will remain reactive, fragmented, and dependent—an institution of lofty declarations but limited impact.