The Venezuela Precedent: What A Shifting World Order Means For The Horn

Over the  years, the confrontation between the United States and Venezuela has repeatedly been framed as a bilateral dispute rooted in democracy, governance, and resources. Last week’s events in the South American country, however, bring to light something larger and far more consequential.

To many, current events in Venezuela represent the next step in 21st century global power mechanisms forged through enforcing sanctions regimes and reshaping diplomacy, energy markets, and economic behavior far beyond Latin America. Africa, and particularly the Horn of Africa, has been among the quiet recipients of those consequences.

The developments in Venezuela did not happen overnight. For decades, the country  was isolated through a comprehensive political strategy that combined economic pressure, diplomatic delegitimization, and financial enforcement. The objective extended beyond regime change. It reinforced a global order in which access to markets, finance, and legitimacy is conditional on alignment with US-led norms.

The approach suggests to other states navigating contested governance and strategic autonomy that sovereignty in the global order would be measured not only by borders, but by compliance.

For African states, this recalibration of power matters greatly. Many operate within tight fiscal margins, rely on external financing, and balance relationships across competing global poles. The Venezuela case showed that political disputes with the United States could trigger far-reaching consequences, even without formal war or UN-mandated sanctions.

Ethiopia, the second most populous country in the continent of Africa and a pivotal state in the Horn, has also had to maneuver within this environment. Its domestic political crises, coupled with its strategic importance, have placed it under intense international scrutiny.

Analysts contend the Venezuela precedent has sharpened the tools available to external actors and narrowed the space for political ambiguity.

Abdurahman Edao, an international and diplomatic relations expert, argues that Washington’s actions toward Venezuela were grounded less in normative concerns than in national interest—specifically energy security.

Since Nicolás Maduro assumed office in 2013, Venezuela’s oil production has sharply declined, a collapse driven by a mix of sanctions and internal mismanagement. Yet the significance of Venezuela extends beyond barrels lost.

According to Abdurahman, the episode exposed how power politics overrides international norms when strategic interests are at stake, particularly at a moment when American global dominance is perceived to be under strain.

“The USA’s recent actions expose how power play overrides international norms and values. This happens at a time when American global dominance is declining, and America shows the world what it can do when it wants to take action. It signals that no regime is immune from the same treatment,” he said.

Other observers harbor similar concerns.

An Ethiopian researcher specializing in Horn politics and speaking anonymously with The Reporter notes that while countries like Ethiopia are unlikely to face Venezuela-style pressure in the near term, the precedent itself is destabilizing.

Unilateral sanctions demonstrate how economic and political might can be used transactionally, placing poorer states at the receiving end of great-power bargaining, he argues, noting that the rules-based international order, once the formal language of global governance, appears increasingly subordinate to raw national interest.

“I don’t see any direct implications of the sanctions regime on countries like Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the unilateral sanctions by the US have demonstrated that economic and political might of a country can be (mis)used to impose transactional foreign relations putting poor countries such as Ethiopia on the receiving end. Ethiopia is an important ally of the US in the Horn and both sides want to maintain that relationship so long as a significant threat emerges for both. The scale and form of sanctions imposed on Ethiopia during the Tigray war are mainly intended at ending the conflict rather than pressuring Ethiopia to surrender its natural resources, like it happened in Venezuela. As it stands now, as both Ethiopia and the US are comfortable with the transactional nature of relations between the two, Venezuela-like impositions is unlikely,” he said.

On the other hand, what follows from this shifting global order is not only pressure on states, but anxiety within regimes whose survival has long depended on predictability. Experts who spoke with The Reporter noted that few leaders in the Horn of Africa embody this unease more clearly than Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki.

The question increasingly being asked, quietly in diplomatic circles and more openly among regional analysts, is not whether Eritrea will change course, but what the region looks like after Isaias.

Those in the diplomatic circles of Addis Ababa argue that the question is not only about precedence but also of consequence. They say the question is what then? The absence of a clear succession plan, the personalization of power, and the deliberate hollowing out of institutions have made “post-Isaias” less a transition scenario than a strategic vacuum, and preparing for that moment has become unavoidable homework for every neighboring capital.

This uncertainty intersects with Sudan’s own instability, particularly the posture of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. For Ethiopia, Sudan is no longer just a neighbor in crisis but a variable in a much larger equation. Al-Burhan’s maneuvering—internally and externally—has limited room for error, yet his actions increasingly affect Ethiopia’s security calculus. There is a growing view in Addis Ababa that Sudan cannot indefinitely play the role of a buffer or a pacifier for Ethiopia’s northern frontier.

Regional alignment is hardening, and ambiguity is becoming costlier.

Somalia represents another deliberate choice point. Ethiopia’s decision to pursue strategic ambiguity, rather than loud alignment, has puzzled some observers but reflects a deeper reading of regional flux. The Somali file is no longer only about counterterrorism or federal fragility; it is about maritime access, external patronage, and shifting Gulf and Western interests. Experts say even while Israel recognizes Somaliland, Ethiopia, by avoiding rigid commitments, has preserved maneuvering space in a moment when alliances are increasingly transactional and short-lived.

Along Eritrea’s southern flank, the Afar front has taken on renewed significance. There is a growing assessment that Isaias is actively probing for reactions, attempting to manufacture pressure points that force responses from Addis Ababa, sources told The Reporter.

They simultaneously acknowledge that Ethiopian military movements have not gone unnoticed in Asmara. On the contrary, they appear to have unsettled the Eritrean leadership, pushing it to search for leverage where it can still provoke without triggering full confrontation. Afar, in this sense, is less a battlefield than a signal.

The Tigray front, meanwhile, has evolved into something more existential for Eritrea’s old guard. Some analysts argue that what remains of the pre-reform security elite is increasingly driven by survival instinct rather than strategic vision.

“As the proverb suggests, it is often at the point of collapse that resistance becomes most frantic. For these actors, instability is not a risk but a shield—an attempt to delay accountability, transition, or irrelevance. Yet this very posture may accelerate the unraveling they seek to avoid,” said one source.

Taken together, the feeling is that these fronts form a totality that may ultimately undermine Isaias Afwerki rather than secure him.

Another key facet of the Venezuelan saga is fuel as political leverage. At the core of the US-Venezuela standoff lies oil. Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven reserves, yet sanctions curtailed its ability to function as a conventional supplier. As a direct result of sanctions, Venezuela’s crude moved through intermediaries and opaque channels, distorting global energy markets rather than removing supply outright.

Abdurahman points out that following Western sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine, the same actors that once isolated Venezuela partially re-engaged with it—underscoring the transactional nature of energy politics.

For Africa, the consequences are indirect but real. Ethiopia does not import oil from Venezuela; its fuel largely comes from the Middle East. Observers agree that Venezuela-specific sanctions do not automatically translate into direct fuel shortages for Addis Ababa. However, markets are interconnected. When sanctioned oil is rerouted, pressure shifts elsewhere, and major consumers then compete more aggressively for Middle Eastern supply, tightening availability and raising prices for import-dependent countries like Ethiopia.

Fuel, therefore, becomes not just a commodity but a geopolitical shock absorber. Experts say that price volatility, rather than outright scarcity, is the mechanism through which distant sanctions are felt. Transportation costs rise, inflation accelerates, and foreign exchange reserves are depleted. What appears as a political decision in Washington manifests as economic stress in Addis Ababa.

In the fractured energy geopolitics, the Horn of Africa occupies a critical position in global energy and trade logistics. The Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb strait are among the world’s most strategic maritime corridors. As energy politics intensify, so does competition over these routes.

The United States’ assertive posture in Venezuela, which Abdurahman links to what realist theorist John Mearsheimer describes as “assertive realism,” reflects a broader doctrine: great powers seek to dominate their perceived spheres of influence and exclude rivals.

In Latin America, this meant limiting Chinese energy involvement in Venezuela. In the Horn of Africa, the same US–China rivalry is playing out through military bases, port access, and diplomatic alignment.

Djibouti hosts multiple foreign military installations. Naval patrols have expanded amid Red Sea tensions. Energy security is no longer separable from militarization. Though landlocked, Ethiopia is deeply embedded in this system. Its fuel imports transit through neighboring ports, making it vulnerable to regional instability, insurance disruptions, and strategic competition among external powers.

In this sense, Venezuela’s relevance to the Horn is structural rather than transactional. By fragmenting global energy flows and encouraging bloc-aligned supply chains, the US-Venezuela standoff contributes to a world in which energy corridors are contested, securitized, and politicized.

Ethiopia’s domestic political challenges have unfolded against this tightening geopolitical landscape. While Addis Ababa remains an important US ally in the Horn, relations have increasingly taken on a transactional character. The anonymous researcher notes that sanctions imposed during the Tigray war were designed primarily to end hostilities rather than extract resources, unlike Venezuela. Both sides, for now, appear comfortable maintaining engagement without escalation.

Yet the Venezuela precedent looms as a cautionary tale. It demonstrates how swiftly diplomatic narratives can harden, how financial access can be restricted, and how sovereignty can be redefined by compliance.

Abdurahaman raises the central policy dilemma: should Ethiopia deepen alignment with China and Russia, attempt to rebalance toward Washington, or pursue a hedging strategy in an increasingly polarized world? The challenge is compounded by growing fractures even among Western allies themselves.

Another expert’s analysis becomes particularly sharp on precedent. The most dangerous legacy of the Venezuela case, the researcher argues, is not oil disruption but the normalization of aggression in the name of national interest. As unilateral action gains legitimacy, the relevance of international law erodes.

This erosion has ripple effects. It legitimizes Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine. It also creates permissive conditions elsewhere. The researcher draws parallels between recent US discourse on Greenland and growing questions around sovereignty in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s renewed push for access to the sea has reopened debates about Eritrea’s independence, particularly the strategic port of Assab.

In this reading, global precedent becomes regional permission. If powerful states can coerce, weaker ones may feel emboldened to do the same within their neighborhoods. The Venezuela case thus feeds into a broader environment where force, pressure, and revisionism appear increasingly acceptable tools of statecraft.

Experts argue that what the US-Venezuela confrontation ultimately demonstrates is not merely the erosion of norms, but the emergence of a new justificatory template for coercive action. In Venezuela’s case, Washington framed its pressure through the language of narcotics trafficking, corruption, and threats to national security. These claims, whether fully substantiated or not, served as the legal and moral scaffolding for unilateral action. The significance lies less in the allegations themselves than in how they were operationalized: as sufficient grounds to bypass multilateral consensus and act decisively.

‎This logic does not remain confined to great powers.

‎Within this emerging framework, states facing adversarial neighbors can plausibly adopt similar reasoning, selectively invoking security-linked crimes to justify coercive measures. For Ethiopia, this creates a dangerous but real precedent. If drug trafficking and alleged narco-terrorism were sufficient grounds for sustained pressure against Venezuela, then human trafficking, forced conscription, indefinite militarization, and systematic population displacement—long associated with the Eritrean state under Isaias Afwerki—could, under the same logic, be framed as legitimate triggers for action, analysts suggest.

‎”The danger is that once international law becomes optional in practice, conflict becomes a matter of sequencing rather than legitimacy. Who moves first, who controls the narrative, and who commands alliances matter more than formal legality,” an expert told The Reporter.